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Book Reviews
Desmond H. Brown, The Genesis of the Canadian Criminal Code of
1892 Toronto: Published for the Osgoode Society by University of
Toronto Press, 1989, 253 pp. $35.00 (cloth).
Brown gives an interesting and readable account of the background of the
1892 Code and its genesis in the politics of the day. His preface and six
short chapters are followed by an epilogue, a short biographical note and
footnotes. Chapter One deals with the ambiguity of the term "code".
Clearly, the 1892 Code was not a codification in the civilian tradition as
exemplified, for example, in the Napoleonic Code, nor was it even a code
such as Bentham might have drafted. It was a "code" only in the loose
sense in which.the word was used by English and Canadian legislators in
the nineteenth century to describe a consolidation and systematization of
statutory law combined with some reform legislation by way of filling
gaps, incorporating some of the common law or expressly altering case
law relating to a particular issue. Indeed, in English Canada in 1892, little
distinction was made between a systematized consolidation and a
codification of the law.
Chapter Two summarizes sixty years of penal reform in England,
culminating with The English Draft Code of 1879. Under the heading of
"Origin and Development of Legal Systems in British North America"
Chapter Three summarizes legislative reforms of criminal law in the pre-
confederation Canadian colonies. Chapter Four entitled "Consolidation
and Codification Before Confederation" gives a detailed account of
various statutory consolidations in the Canadian colonies; it suggests an
implicit dependence of "codification" upon development of certain
drafting skills. Chapter Five deals with the Revised Statutes of Canada,
1886 which Brown sees as an important prelude the 1892 Code. The
implication is that the 1886 consolidation gave the Code drafters a
necessary foundation on which to proceed with the Code, namely, a clear
and up to date statement of Canadian criminal law and procedure. The
1886 revision also provided an opportunity for one of the commissioners,
G.W Burbidge, to draft a proposed Code of Criminal Law to take the
place of the "revised" criminal law statutes. He was unsuccessful in
persuading the Commission Chairman to make the substitution. Chapter
Six moves beyond the 1886 consolidation and lays bare the genesis of the
Code of 1892.
This genesis, it appears, lies not in a nobly conceived plan of law
reform by a high minded public servant bent on serving the public good,
but in narrow partisan politics; in short, a desire by Sir John Thompson,
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Minister of Justice, to stay one step ahead of the Liberals on the
codification issue and to prevent them from embarrassing the government
on the matter. Brown outlines the following incident. In the fall of 1889
Thompson received an offer from Sir Henri-Elizar Taschereau to draft a
Canadian criminal code. Taschereau was highly regarded not only as a
judge, but for his sophisticated and professional publication of the
annotated federal criminal statutes which rivalled Burbidge's Digest and
surpassed it with their clear, logical style. Although Thompson had a long
history of initiating legislative action to "systematize" the law, by the time
Taschereau made his offer in 1889 one would have thought that
Thompson's passion for order and system would have been cooled by the
recent and exhaustive work on the Revised Statutes of 1886. According
to Brown, Thompson felt he could not reject Taschereau's offer with a
flat "No". Taschereau was a Liberal appointee to the bench and
Thompson apparently felt that if Taschereau were given a simple
rejection he would proceed to draft a code on his own, in which event,
the Liberal opposition would pick it up and introduce it as a private
member's bill, to the embarrassment of the government. Brown suggests
that Thompson engaged in a bit of a fiction: he told Taschereau not to
waste his time drafting a code since the Department of Justice was
already at work on such a project. Thompson then immediately turned
around and contacted Burbidge with an offer to start work on a code.
The laws of patronage, apparently, forbid the making of such an offer to
Taschereau. Brown's guess as to Thompson's motive in failing to accept
Taschereau's offer has an air of reality about it. It would not be the first
time, nor the last, that important legislative or constitutional changes
hinged on considerations of partisan political advantage. The genesis of
the Code was, perhaps, a case of partisan advantage running parallel to
noble purpose.
There is no suggestion that the Prime Minister, Sir John A.
MacDonald, played a role in the 1892 Code, although the inference is
that he was sympathetic to the idea. The fact was that MacDonald was
exhausted and ill; on first reading of the Bill to introduce the Code in
Parliament, Thompson was summoned from the House by MacDonald
who promptly collapsed. The Prime Minister was seriously ill and in
three weeks lay dead. Thompson steered the Code through Parliament
with Abbott as Prime Minister.
The reader may ask as to the genesis of the Code, is that all there is,
a deceptive partisan ploy made with a view to keeping ahead of the
Liberals? Is there nothing else, for example, what sources did Thompson
rely on in scraping together a Code within a bare eighteen months of
Taschereau's offer? Simply put, the materials were already on hand.
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Brown's account makes clear that for over sixty years in both Canada and
England, law reform, including criminal law reform, occupied a
prominent place on the public agenda: Select Committee Reports, Royal
Commission Reports, the Draft Codes of 1843 and 1849 in England and
the consolidation of penal statutes, Stephen's Digest of the criminal law,
Stephen's Draft Code of 1878, Wright's Code, the English Draft Code of
1879, and in the Canadian colonies, the progressive Nova Scotian Code
of 1841 followed by the elegant consolidations of 1851 and 1873 with
parallel work in New Brunswick. In addition the Canadians had
experienced the perils of an over-hasty adoption of purely English
reforms: the federal Criminal Law Statutes of 1869, being paraphrases of
Greaves' 1861 Consolidation of English criminal law, at least in respect
to substantive law, served as an unfortunate precedent. Besides all this,
Thompson had on hand Taschereau's extensive and learned publication
of the annotated criminal law statutes, Burbidge's Digest of Canadian
criminal law, modelled on Stephen's Digest and the extensive and careful
federal consolidation of 1886. In addition to this English and Canadian
material, the Canadians had access to the codification work that had been
on-going in Massachusetts, New York and elsewhere in the United States.
The English reforms and the progress of the English Draft Bill of 1879
and the detailed Royal Commission analysis of that proposal were well
known to Burbidge, Sedgewick and Masters, three of the five people
Thompson selected to draft the Canadian Code. Besides being abreast of
codification movements in England, Burbidge had practical experience in
drafting and in thinking about appropriate forms and ordering of
consolidations of penal law in New Brunswick; Masters also had
practical experience.
The result was that Thompson's Code reflected Burbidge's admiration
for the work of Stephen and the English Draft Code. This reflection is
found in the organization, structure and style of drafting of the 1892
Code. As for content, the Canadian Code differed from the English Draft
Code in that it included both indictable and summary conviction
procedure, and in these matters relied heavily on Canadian statutory law.
There were some procedural reforms traceable directly to the E.D.C.,
particularly the abolition of the common law classification of crimes as
felonies or misdemeanors and replacing it with the now familiar
indictable/summary conviction categories. Although classification would
affect right to trial by jury, the name change per se did not greatly affect
criminal procedure as Canadian lawyers knew it. The powers of the
grand jury were restricted, but that move had considerable support
throughout the profession. Punishments were largely reflective of those in
the existing federal statutes.
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With respect to substantive law, the Code reflected much of the
existing Canadian law respecting offences, law that in turn reflected the
English consolidation of 1861. However, important substantive changes
were made, following the EDC in that, for the first time, definitions of
offences were included for some crimes: rape, murder, robbery and theft.
Indeed, theft was a wholly new offence, replacing common law larceny,
following Stephen's Draft Code and the E.D.C.
How was it, then, that a Canadian parliament enacted a Code of
criminal law when similar efforts in England had failed in the face of a
hostile opposition both within and outside Parliament? Brown suggests
that both sides of the Atlantic offered a climate supportive of criminal
codes; in England the E.D.C. failed principally because the government
attempted to ram the legislation down the throat of the Opposition
whereas in Canada, Thompson proceeded with consummate skill to get
the cooperation of the Opposition through a joint committee of the
Senate and House of Commons, that being only the second time of using
such a joint committee. More importantly, Brown suggests Thompson
allayed fears in advance; he extolled the Bill as one based principally on
the imperial model in Westminster, that is on the English Draft Code,
and taking what was best from Stephen's Digest Burbidge's Digest and
Canadian statute law. Thompson downplayed or omitted to mention the
changes the Bill would bring about and downplayed the codification
aspect of the Bill; instead he emphasized the need to reduce "needless
technicalities, obscurities and other defects which the experience of
administration was disclosed."
Despite Brown's admiration for Thompson's parliamentary skills it is
astonishing to this reader that he could get away with first and second
reading without distributing copies of the Bill. Even more of an affront to
Parliament, it would seem, was Thompson's distribution of 2000 copies
of the bill to the bench, bar and "leading members" of the public six
months in advance of members of Parliament being allowed to see a
copy. Printer delays were blamed but Brown suggests that Thompson
was keen to restrict knowledge as to how far the Bill went beyond a
simple consolidation. Yet Thompson did tell the House that the Bill,
following the E.D.C., would abolish the felony/misdemeanor distinction
and follow the E.D.C. with respect to some substantive changes in the
law; however, throughout, Thompson downplayed the extent of the
changes. Brown refers to Thompson's "ploy" of playing up the popular
notion that grand jury powers would be restricted, but avoiding
discussion of more significant changes.
A reading of Brown's book underscores the hopeless tangled obscurity
of the criminal law in the eighteenth century and the enthusiasm with
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which legislatures and others on both sides of the Atlantic for over 60
years attacked the mass with a view to systemization, order, clarity and
accessibility. The wonder is not that the criminal law was reduced to
some type of code form but that it did not occur sooner.
Brown's book suggests that the central Canada view of the world was
imposed on federal policy in criminal reform at an early stage. As early
as 1841 Nova Scotia adopted an elegant and progressive codification of
its criminal law and the levels of punishment were the most humane of
any of the Canadian colonies and more humane than those in England.
New Brunswick, too, had taken the "codification" approach, but when
Sir John A. MacDonald felt constrained to legislate federal criminal law
in 1869 he decided not to follow the Nova Scotian or "Maritime" models
for fear of stirring provincial jealousies - he opted instead for an
unsuitable paraphrase of the Greaves consolidation of English criminal
law of 1861 and the relatively harsh levels of punishment reflective of
pre-confederation Quebec and Ontario rather than Nova Scotia. It is an
unwritten history, perhaps, but in this area, at least, Canadians to their
detriment, neglected to take advantage of the Nova Scotian wisdom and
experience.
Brown suggests that Canada got a Code where England failed because
Canada was not faced with a hostile and historically powerful bench and
bar committed to defending the common law against all legislative
reform. This may well overstate the extent of the hostility in England, for,
as he points out, the E.D.C. failed not so much because the judges
publicly expressed their hostility to legislative reform, but because of
inept handling of legislation on the floor of the House. Certainly, Brown
may well be right in saying that Canadian lawyers and, indeed, the public
generally, in 1892 had an openness to legislation and codification; an
openness born of the many pre and post-Confederation attempts to
untangle the obscure mass of inherited English law and the volumes of
amending Canadian legislation. Brown writes:
The conditions in Ottawa were completely different from those that
obtained in London. In contrast to England, Canada was a country of vast
distances and separate jurisdictions. Its inhabitants were subject to
rational, written constitutions which specified the structure of the court
systems and the composition of their benches. Unlike the central courts at
Westminster and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the
Supreme Court of Canada was not supreme, and the senior provincial
courts with criminal jurisdiction were unsupervised tribunals of equal and
concurrent jurisdiction. Canadian legal systems were staffed with judges
and lawyers who had been educated in a variety of autonomous systems
different from the Inns of Court and from each other.
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In general Brown is an enthusiastic supporter of the Code but the
reader may wish to suspend judgment until the Code is compared with
other models that were then available, including Wright's Code and
Taschereau's proposal of 1889. Brown tells us nothing about
Taschereau's proposed Code, perhaps the state of the archives is such as
to make it virtually impossible even to find out, nor is there any
comparison made with Codes enacted about the same time in some
American jurisdictions and later in New Zealand and Queensland.
All in all Brown's book is a readable account of the background of
criminal law reform on both sides of the Atlantic in the sixty years
preceding the Code, with principal emphasis on English developments.
Certain themes appear to run through the text without overt explication,
including the importance of the intellectual climate of the times, the
interesting relationship between developing skills of drafting and the
concept of codification; the misunderstood use of the term "codification"
itself; the Canadian, pre-confederation law reform movement and the
American influence, the connection between parliamentary skills and law
reform, the importance of personalities in promoting law reform and the
role of chance and political partisanship. Instead of developing themes
Brown tends to give a detailed factual account of how certain selected
events developed and matured; thus for example, chapter five gives a
great deal of detail respecting the revised Statutes of Canada 1886. The
reader may find herself carried along by Brown's enthusiasm despite the
lack of an obvious need for example, to spend a whole chapter
establishing the connection between the 1886 revision and the 1892
Code.
Keith Jobson
Faculty of Law
University of Victoria.
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Pierre Patenaude, La preuve, les techniques modernes et le respect des
valeurs fondamentales. (Sherbrooke: Les Editions Revue de Droit,
Universit6 de Sherbrooke, 1990, 235 + xv pp. $40.00 (paper).
In La preuve, les techniques modernes et le respect des valeurs
fondamentales, Professor Pierre Patenaude has produced a scholarly and
practical inquiry into the question of how law responds to science. This
book raises questions of the gathering, the admissibility and the reliability
of evidence through modem techniques such as electronic surveillance,
breathalyzer tests, lie detectors, radar, the administration of truth-
inducing drugs, and hypnosis. It combines a thoughtful examination of
values underlying the law of evidence with an introduction to the
complexities and the frailities of scientific investigative techniques.
Professor Patenaude originally conceived these materials as a set of
lecture notes for use by students in a course that he pioneered to study the
conjunction of evidentiary law and emerging technologies. It was at the
urging of practitioners who were invited to participate on an occasional
basis in the course that Professor Patenaude has now published his book.
It is not difficult to understand how both students and practitioners
would find this book useful and stimulating. Its utility lies its
development of a framework to address issues posed by the "vertiginous
pace" at which scientific ivestigative techniques have developed during
the latter half of this century.'
Its stimulation emerges from two dominant characteristics of Professor
Patenaude's style: electricism of sources, and concern for underlying
values.
Professor Patenaude draws upon the Canadian law of criminal
evidence, upon Quebec and continental civil law, and upon United States
constitutional law. He introduces readers to scientific debates from both
scholarly and popular sources. Throughout, the discussion he is attentive
to questions of underlying values.
The advantage of this electic and value-conscious approach is that it
obliges the reader and the student to go beyond positivistic problem-
solving to reflect on fundamental questions that include: what ought to be
the respective roles of legislator and judge in developing new rules of
evidence; how does the Charter of Rights affect the balance of interests
and values in this area; and, how confident can we be that science
1. Wong v. The Queen, (Unreported decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, November 22,
1990), per La Forest J. The reference by La Forest J. is in particular to eavesdropping
technology. In the fall term of 1990, the Supreme Court decided several major cases involving
the use of electronic technologies.
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provides an answer to the considerable challenges of reliable fact-finding,
even if truth were the singular objective?
Professor Patenaude's discussion of values is notable for being more
broadly humanistic than is the traditional discourse about evidentiary
rules. He emphasizes two basic interests: the individual interest in privacy,
and the inviolability of the human person. He is also concerned about
individuality and, ultimately, about democracy itself.2 He articulates the
relevant interests in terms of four ideals: the social, the political, the
affective and the physical. While courts typically advert to the privacy
interest, the ultimate choice tends to come down to a balancing of
concerns for a fair trial against concerns for effective law enforcement.3
This is not Professor Patenaude's central preoccupation. So, in this sense
it might be said that the discussion of values is out of step with judicial
discourse about evidence. But there is much to be said for a clearer
articulation of the humane emphases that are underlined by Professor
Patenaude; these values are, or ought to be, comprehended by the
balancing analysis. That said, Professor Patenaude's discussion would
benefit from a more explicit assessment of concerns focussed on the
administration ofjustice and on the trial itself.
An element of this book that typically does not enter into
consideration of the rules of evidence is its discussion of reliability.
Professor Patenaude takes the reader through a series of modem
techniques, including the breathalyzer, the lie detector, photography,
recorded conservations and radar, and develops a discussion around the
probative force of each. For example there is a discussion of the reliability
of voice identification, a critical issue in wire-taps. The reader is treated
to an electic range of sources, from the United States National Research
CounciP to the Journal of the Acoustical Society of America to more
2. "La surveillance amine l'unification: elle assimile chacun i une moyenne collective, le prive
de la libert6 de choix, ali~ne son independence. C'est la d6chcance de la d~mocratie." (at 6).
3. This debate about values underlying evidentiary rules in the context of new technologies is
reflected in recent judgments of the Supreme Court in Dersch v. Attorney General of Canada
(November 22, 1990); LaChance v. R.; and Garofoli v. R? (unreported decisions dated
November 22, 1990). The central issues in these cases were access by the accused to the sealed
packet containing affidavits upon which authorizations of wiretaps were based, and whether
the accused is entitled to cross-examine on the affidavits. There was also an issue regarding the
scope of the original authorization. The majority judgment of Sopinka J. favours access and,
in the circumstances, cross-examination, emphasizing the interest in the making of a full answer
and defence. The dissenting judgment of McLachlin J. (concurring in Dersch) emphasizes the
interests of the accused in the protection of privacy and a fair trial, including the right to make
full and answer and defence, but adds that these are to balance against the public interest in
the administration ofjustice, including concerns for protecting the identity of informers.
4. On the Theory and Practice of Voice Identification (1979).
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popular scientific journals.5 This material is presented in an entirely
accessible fashion, reflecting its origins as a set of readings for students in
an advanced course. Again, Professor Patenaude shows no signs of
dogmatism. Various points of view are marshalled and critical debates are
identified, but the reader is given credit for being able to reach his or her
own assessment, and for being able to make further inquiries. The central
message is that, in science as in law, there are debates about values and
about effectiveness. It is to Professor Patenaude's credit that these debates
are exposed for, but left with, the reader. From the perspective of the
prospective purchaser, this material may be the most unique aspect of the
book. There is an effective discussion, accompanied by a rich and eclectic
bibliography. People trained primarily in law do not have regular access
to, and do not have research skills to locate, this kind of information.
So, this is not an ordinary book about the law of evidence. It pushes
the normal bounds of the discourse, but in a pragmatic and a principled
way. Its greatest value is as an occasion for reflection on how the law of
evidence deals with new technologies. It is the kind of book that makes
an invigorating first-read, and that will be a useful addition to ones law
library. One caution, this book really does require a serious first-read;
otherwise, it is unlikely to be used as an occasional reference.
Wade MacLauchlan
Faculty of Law
Dalhousie University.
5. E.g., Bert Black, "Evolving Legal Standards for the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence"
(1988), 239 Science 1508. This is cited, as is the Research Council publication, ibid, at 183.
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Rod D. Margo, Aviation Insurance (2nd ed.). London: Butterworths,
1989. liii + 573. $212.00 (cloth).
The first edition of Aviation Insurance was an outgrowth of the author's
graduate work at McGill University's Institute of Air and Space Law.
Detailed and comprehensive, it filled a noticeable void in Butterworth's
Insurance Series.' Dr. Margo has now drawn upon a decade of practice
in the field 2 to make a fine book even better.
The new edition is more than a simple update. The layout has been
partially rearranged to present a more logical and readable outline. What
was once 31 chapters has been shrunk to 27. This was done by including
"Slips and Proposal Forms" as a subheading under Chapter 6,
"Underwriting Practice and Formation of the Contract". "Proximate
Cause" is now a division of Chapter 23, "Extent of Insurer's Liability".
Four other chapters have been merged into two.3 The result is a cleaner
and more polished structure that better ties together relevent principles.
Another important change - one of particular significance to North
American readers - is the addition of materials on the peculiarities of
U.S. practice, included as subsections in "The Aviation Insurance
Market", "The Relationship Between the Parties", and "Underwriting
Practice". Other new inclusions are discussions of the roles of agents,
surveyors and adjusters, and punitive and exemplary damages. Chapter
21, formerly "Satellite Insurance", has been broadened to "Spacecraft
Insurance", a change that is also reflected in the book's subtitle.
There have been many important developments since publication of
the first edition in 1980, and all are canvassed in the new book. Some
specific examples are in Chapter 4, "The Aviation Insurance Market",
which has been updated to reflect the Lloyd's Act 1982, the Insurance
Companies Act 1982 and other new legislation. Recent cases on the slip
form are fully discussed in Chapter 6. Chapter 7, which deals with the
insurable interest, now includes the landmark Kosmopolous decision.4
Chapter 21 refers the reader to several helpful papers on spacecraft
1. Other titles in the series are Fire and Motor Insurance (4th ed., 1984), General Principles
of Insurance Law (5th ed., 1986), Marine Insurance (4th ed., 1985), Personal Acciden4 Life
and Other Insurances (2nd ed., 1980), all by E.R.H. Ivamy; Insurance of Commercial Risks
(1986), Insurance of Professional Negligence Risks (2nd ed., 1989), both by D.C. Jess; and
The Law of Liability Insurance (1990), by Derrington and Ashton.
2. With Condon & Forsyth, Los Angeles.
3. "Claims and Adjustment" and "The Making of a Claim" are now "The Presentation and
Adjustment of Claims", and "Forms" and "Contents" are combined as "The Forms and
Contents of the Policy".
4. Constitution Ins. Co. of Canada v. Kosmopolous, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 2, 34 D.L.R. (4th) 208,
74 N.R. 360,21 O.A.C. 4,36 B.L.R. 245,22 C.C.L.1 296, [1987] I.L.R. 1-2147.
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insurance and liability which have appeared since the first edition. In
short, the book has been thoroughly updated to present a current picture
of the law.
The most outstanding characteristic of Aviation Insurance is its
accessibility. The excellent tables of cases and statutes and the very
complete index have been supplemented by a new table of abbreviations
and a list of reports and journals cited. When these features are combined
with the straightforward and well-documented writing style, the whole is
an eminently practical and authoritative reference that makes research
quick and easy. Rather suprisingly, the page headings, which in the first
edition alternately reflected the chapter and subheadings, now only
present the chapter title; in my opinion, this is a step backward, as it no
longer allows the reader to flip through the pages for relevant issues. The
table of contents may of course be consulted, with some loss of
convenience.
The main text is followed by an appendix of policy forms, clauses and
endorsements. These have been made substantially more complete by the
inclusion of third party forms and American accident clauses. Canadian
needs are specifically addressed by the addition of AVN 57 (aircraft
accident liability insurance), AVS 102 (C.T.C. air carrier regulations),
and NMA 303 (TP [CG] public liability). In fact, the appendix has now
swollen to over 200 pages. Perhaps it is now time for the publication of
a separate and more easily updated compendium of aviation insurance
clauses?5 Finally, the appendix too has been made considerably more
accessible by the addition of helpful keys to the AVN, AVS and NMA
reference numbers.
The book is not without flaws. Although its didactic style will be
welcomed by researchers, one occasionally wishes the author would
provide more interpretative and speculative analysis; this would better
allow him to display his undoubted scholarship, and might well permit
the reader to obtain a more thorough grasp of the issues. The absence of
a bibliography was previously noted in a review of the first edition;6 this
ommission has not been rectified. Another problem is the citation of
Canadian cases. No alternative citations are provided (unlike British
cases, which are fully referenced). At the very least, citations should be to
official report series wherever possible.7 Finally, at over two hundred
dollars the book seems unusually expensive, even given its specialized
5. Similar to the convenient Reference Book of Marine Insurance Clauses. London: Witherby
& Co. Ltd., new edition published annually.
6. J.-L. Magdelenat, "Book Review" (1980), 5 Ann. Air & Space L. 701, at 702.
7. Most Canadian citations are to the Dominion Law Reports or the Insurance Law Reporter.
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topic and U.K. printing. However, these complaints are obviously minor
in nature, and are not intended to detract from the author's efforts in any
way.
In conclusion, Dr. Margo is to be congratulated on the detailed
coverage he has given his subject. The second edition is a substantial
improvement on an already well-written treatise. It makes a noteworthy
addition to the existing works on air law, and should enhance the
author's growing reputation as the leading authority on aviation
insurance.
Roger Harris
Member, Editorial Committee
Dalhousie Law School
